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Abstract Quine and Wittgenstein were dominant figures in philosophy in 
the middle of the twentieth century. Many readers, like Quine himself, have 
felt that there are deep similarities between the two thinkers, though those 
similarities are difficult to articulate. I argue that they share the project of 
understanding the meaning of utterances by reference to the environment of 
the speaker, though they understand that environment in radically different 
ways. In particular, Quine has a much thinner conception of the environ-
ment than does Wittgenstein. For Quine, the stimulus is impoverished in a 
way that it is not for Wittgenstein. I also argue that they share a certain de-
flationary approach to ontology.
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Introduction
W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein have enjoyed and suffered sim-
ilar fates. Their voices were dominant in philosophy in the middle of 
the twentieth century and for some time afterwards. Since then, their 
influence has dwindled. The dwindlings have differed in nature. Witt-
genstein has a dedicated group of followers who labour both to inter-
pret his work and to apply his ideas, but these labours are often ignored 
by philosophers outside the group. Quine has suffered an even crueller 
fate: he has become an inspiration. He is routinely credited as a pioneer 
of philosophy’s naturalistic turn, but it is becoming rare to find philoso-
phers engaging with the detail of his arguments.
Perhaps this is just and right; perhaps their reputations were inflated, 
and philosophy was right to move out of their shadows. But it is also 
possible that a reassessment is due. One way to reassess both thinkers 
is to make them communicate with each other. This paper is meant as a 
small contribution to that project.
There are obvious and massive differences between these two thinkers.1 
Perhaps most obviously, Quine believed in integrating philosophy and 
1  For scepticism about the possibility of a comparison such as I draw in this paper, 
see Kripke (1982: 5-7) and Hintikka (1990: 167-9). 
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science, whereas Wittgenstein’s tendency was to separate them almost en-
tirely. Nevertheless one has a vague feeling, in reading both authors, that 
their thought is similar in ways that are difficult to capture. Quine him-
self felt this similarity, and said so, but he never expanded on the point.2
In section one I define a project in which, I claim, Quine and the later 
Wittgenstein3 were both engaged. In section two I discuss Quine’s ap-
proach to the project; in section three I turn to Wittgenstein. These sec-
tions together display the differences between these philosophers. In 
section four I defend my view that beneath these important divergences 
lies a deeper convergence. 
In brief, the crucial difference lies in their conception of the environ-
ment which humans confront. For both, reference to this environment 
explains the content of our thought and talk. But Wittgenstein’s con-
ception of the environment is much richer than Quine’s. As a slogan, I 
will say that for Quine the stimulus is impoverished, while for Wittgen-
stein it is not. 
The convergence lies in a certain deflatory attitude to questions of on-
tology. But Wittgenstein carries out this project more thoroughly. I shall 
argue that it is precisely the poverty of the Quinean stimulus that pre-
vents Quine from going as far as Wittgenstein does in the deflation of 
ontological questions.
§ 1. The project
Quine and Wittgenstein have an enemy in common. As Wittgenstein 
puts it in the Blue Book, this enemy is the illusion of explanation that 
arises when one attributes the meaningfulness of discourse to “some-
thing in the occult sphere” (1958: 5). What is the occult sphere, and how 
does this illusion of explanation arise?
2  Quine remarks (1960: 76-7) on the connection between Wittgenstein’s dictum 
that “understanding a sentence means understanding a language” and his own 
theory of the indeterminacy of translation, making the intriguing but unspecified 
suggestion that the latter “will have little air of paradox” for those familiar with Witt-
genstein’s later philosophy of language. He also connects (p. 260) his own and Witt-
genstein’s metaphilosophical views. Wittgenstein never mentions Quine in print; 
neither, so far as I have been able to discover from published sources, did he ever 
mention him in conversation. For comparisons of the two thinkers from a largely 
Wittgensteinian perspective see the papers in Arrington and Glock 1996. The feeling 
alluded to in the text is well captured by the title of Peter Hacker’s contribution to 
the volume: “Proximity at great distance”. See also Heal 1989.
3  Our focus here will be on the Wittgenstein of the Blue Book, composed in 1933-4 
and part one of the Philosophical Investigations, complete by 1945.
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Suppose that we are interested in understanding the meaningfulness 
of some utterance, say the command “Shut the door!” How did this ut-
terance come to mean what it does? We notice that the command ex-
presses someone’s wish that the door be shut. Having noticed this, it is 
tempting to suppose that the content of the utterance is explained by 
the content of the wish that it expresses. On this view, what explains the 
fact that “shut the door!” means what it does is the prior fact that the 
speaker wishes that the door be shut. 
This fact about the psychology of the speaker alone cannot do the ex-
planatory work, since the speaker could have that wish without having 
even the means to express the wish in that work – the speaker might not 
speak English, for example. So we have to postulate a further fact about 
the speaker’s psychology: that something about that psychology maps 
the content of the wish onto the words uttered.
This is the move to which Wittgenstein objects. His objection is not to 
the appeal to psychology as such. Nothing in this passage suggests that 
there is anything illegitimate about positing facts about psychology or 
about the speaker’s mental life. He objects, rather, to the idea that mere 
appeal to psychology helps in the particular task of explanation at hand.
The account supposes that an explanatorily relevant mapping between 
content and words takes place in the speaker’s psychology. It assumes 
that merely attributing the mapping to the psychological domain will 
provide an explanation where one was lacking before. The mapping be-
tween content and words was what was to be explained in the first place. 
We have attempted to do our explanatory work simply by moving the 
mapping into the psychological sphere, without showing why a map-
ping in that sphere should be any less problematic than the mapping 
with which we started. The explanation is illusory.
The illusion consists in supposing that mental states are, like sentences, 
bearers of meaning, but unlike sentences are self-interpreting. Thus it 
is supposed that thoughts, intentions and mental images are like self-
interpreting signs. It is this idea that strikes Wittgenstein as “occult”.
Quine, too, frequently complains of uncritical appeals to a mentalistic 
domain of meanings, made when we think about language.4 His project 
4  The criticism of such appeals is a theme of Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiri-
cism”. But the felt need to carry on both philosophy and linguistics without unex-
plained appeal to meanings motivates much of Quine’s work: see for example Quine 
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can be understood as an attempt to construct an understanding of lan-
guage without reference to such a domain. 
The project is a difficult one because of the many ways in which the no-
tion of meaning is presupposed in our ordinary thought and talk about 
language. Let us take, as an example, the notion of synonymy. (This no-
tion is of crucial importance to Quine). Take two synonymous sentences: 
the French sentence “mes pantalons sont vertes” and the English sentence 
“my trousers are green”. What does this relation of synonymy consist in?
Clearly, we cannot explain the synonymy relation by appealing to the 
fact that the two sentences have the same meaning. For two sentences 
to be synonymous just is for them to be alike in meaning. Thus their 
having a meaning is not explanatorily prior to their being synonymous.
Here a temptation similar to that with which Wittgenstein was con-
cerned arises. Given that the two sentences are synonymous, we may 
infer that they both express the same thought: that my trousers are 
green. So we may suppose that by referring to this thought, we can pro-
vide an explanation of the meaning of each sentence, and thus of their 
synonymy.
But, once again, this line of thought can provide only an illusion of ex-
planation. In order for reference to thoughts to be explanatory we have 
again to postulate mappings, on the part of speakers of both the French 
and the English sentence, of content onto sentence. But, again, how one 
content is mapped on to another was what was to be explained. If we are 
dissatisfied with appealing to a mapping of sentence on to sentence di-
rectly, it has not been made clear why we should be any more satisfied 
with a mapping of the same thought on to each sentence individually.
Both philosophers, then, oppose a style of explanation which, by look-
ing inward to a psychological domain of meaning and thought, yields 
a mere illusion of the understanding of language. They both demand 
something better. The direction in which they look for an alternative is 
also similar. Both look in the direction of what might vaguely be called 
external, public points of reference and modes of response: things with 
which the discursive subject interacts. Just what this means will turn 
out to be a very delicate matter – indeed, the crucial factor separating 
these philosophers – but in both cases the drive is towards the outer.
1953c: 48, where the danger of illusions of explanation is mentioned explicitly, and 
1970: 1 and throughout.
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§ 2. The drive to the outer: Quine
To understand Quine’s drive to the outer, it helps to understand a sim-
ilar drive on the part of the philosophical tradition which Quine both 
absorbed and criticised – that of radical empiricism. In particular, it is 
an empiricist account of the meanings of utterances in which we are 
interested.
A simplified version of the empiricist account might run as follows. The 
theorist takes certain utterances to be appropriate responses to cer-
tain environmental conditions.5 The empiricist move is to identify the 
meaning of the utterance outright with the environmental condition to 
which it is an appropriate response. 
Any empiricist approach of language must proceed on the basis of the 
empirical evidence available to the linguist: the sounds made by speak-
ers and the environmental conditions under which those sounds are 
made. The simple empiricist account just mentioned has the advantage 
of making the job of empiricist linguistics – matching utterance to envi-
ronmental condition – identical with the job of giving a theory of mean-
ing for the language.
If we assume that our theory of meaning must preserve what we take 
pre-theoretically to be the meanings of our utterances, then the simple 
empirical approach will fail. Many utterances – for example, truisms – 
are appropriate under any empirical conditions, but they do not all mean 
the same thing. Thus the environment underdetermines their meaning.
It is, further, very plausible that the environment can overdetermine the 
meanings of utterances. Some utterances depend for their appropriate-
ness on more than the environment: they depend, for example, on the 
values of the speaker. Thus, plausibly, whether my utterance to the ef-
fect that the result of the horse race was a good one depends not only 
on which horse won but also on which horse I wanted to win (perhaps, 
which horse I had betted on).
One possible response is to attempt to develop empiricism such that 
it provides an account of our pre-theoretical conception of meaning. 
The logical positivists attempted to do so by providing independent 
5  Carnap, Quine’s major influence in the empiricist tradition, took appropriateness 
to consist in truth. But in putting things in this general way, I abstract from different 
possible ways of understanding appropriateness. It is the general point in which we 
are particularly interested.
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accounts of truisms (in terms of logical truths) and value judgements 
(in terms of the expression of emotions).
Another possible response is to maintain the empiricist method as it 
is, and replace our pre-theoretical conception of meaning for another 
conception for which empiricism does provide a good theory. This is 
Quine’s route.
It is often said that Quine rejects verificationist theories of meaning as 
the “second dogma” of empiricism. This is true, but easily misconstrued 
if one supposes that Quine replaces the verificatonist theory of mean-
ing with some other theory intended to carry out the same task. Instead 
of adopting some other theory meant to account for the pre-theoretical 
notion of meaning, Quine retains verificationism as the right method-
ology both for philosophy and for linguistics, and rejects the notion of 
meaning.
He adopts verificationism as a theory of another notion – stimulus 
meaning – which unlike our ordinary notion of meaning is, he consid-
ers, scientifically respectable, precisely because an empiricist theory of 
it is possible. Thus, the notion of stimulus meaning is not meant to ap-
proximate the ordinary notion of meaning. It only does so for a limited 
class of expressions (1960: 36-7). For many others, there is no approxi-
mation. Indeed, part of Quine’s point is that the scientifically respect-
able notion of stimulus meaning falls well short of the pre-theoretical 
notion of meaning. The gap between the two notions is the measure of 
the poverty of the stimulus.
The stimulus meaning of an expression is a class of stimulations: the 
class consisting of those stimulations upon which assent to the expres-
sion would be elicited. In order to understand the notion of stimulus 
meaning there are thus two further Quinean notions to be understood: 
that of a stimulation and that of assent.
What, precisely, is a stimulation? Tentatively, Quine identifies it (in the 
visual case) with a “pattern of chromatic irradiation of the eye” (1960: 
31). There are two features of Quine’s choice which are of particular rel-
evance to us. First, stimulations are to be described in physical terms. 
The notion of chromatic irradiation is drawn from physical theory. It is 
based on what we know about the physiology of vision and its physical 
basis. Second, the physically described features of the world chosen by 
Quine are located at the surface of the subject’s body. They are proximal 
rather than distal. 
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Since they are to be described in physical terms, Quinean stimulations 
are not private mental entities. It can be ascertained by a third party 
just what stimulations a subject is undergoing. At least in principle, one 
could ascertain this by examining the retina. 
More importantly, one can without expertise in physiology or the use 
of specialised technology empathise with the point of view of others by 
the use of what one might call the geometric imagination. The differ-
ence in retinal pattern from subject to subject is a matter of angle and 
distance from the objects of vision. Thus I can imagine how things look 
to you by allowing for your location and point of view.
We might identify Quinean stimuli with perspectives on the world, pro-
vided we remember that these perspectives are not mental entities. This 
is why Quinean stimuli are still external. In the relevant sense of “per-
spective” my perspective would be the same as yours if we were to stand 
in the same place.
The choice of proximal over distal stimulations is also crucial. Retinal 
patterns vary with the disposition of the subject as well as with the sub-
ject’s physical environment. Because they are proximal, Quinean stimu-
lations can vary independently of their distal cause. A physical object in 
the dark or at a distance creates a different retinal pattern from the same 
object in better visual conditions. 
Further, distal objects can differ independently of stimulations. Dif-
ferent objects can create the same retinal pattern. This occurs when-
ever two different objects look alike from a given location under given 
conditions. These variations can, in principle, be predicted and taken 
 account of by third parties.
Quine counts these features of retinal patterns as reasons for choos-
ing them over physical objects as candidates for the role of stimulation 
(1960: 31). The reason is that a closer correlation can be made between 
utterances, on the one hand, and stimulations, on the other, if the stim-
ulations in question are proximal. If I know not only what sort of physi-
cal environment a speaker inhabits, but also how that environment af-
fects the speaker’s sensory organs, I will be in a better position to predict 
the speaker’s utterances.
What of the notion of assent? For Quine, empiricism demands that as-
sent must be understood in purely behavioural terms, on a narrow con-
ception of behaviour (1960: 57-8). Assent must consist in the making of 
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some sound, audibly distinguishable by a third party, or in some bodily 
movement.
This notion of assent is far removed from our ordinary notion. To  assent 
to something is, roughly, to agree to it. Such agreement can be signalled 
by sound or gesture, but does not in general consist in either. Once 
again, this gap between the ordinary concept and the Quinean concept 
is deliberate. Quinean assent is the form of assent that can be appealed 
to in a theory of language, under empiricist principles.
To see why, suppose that we were to liberalise this conception of  assent, 
and say that a subject assents to an utterance whenever he or she ex-
presses agreement with it. This assent can then take the form of ex-
pressing what the utterance expresses. We are now appealing to our pri-
or knowledge of the equivalence of the contents of utterances – that is, 
of their synonymy. But it is just this relation of synonymy which was to 
be explained.
Let us suppose, optimistically, that for a given speaker a good theory 
of stimulus meaning can be formulated. That is, we can predict with 
some accuracy what utterances a speaker will assent to given certain 
stimulations. 
Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is then as follows. 
Such speaker-relative theories of stimulus meaning will not be suffi-
cient to determine a single scheme of translation between the utter-
ances of different speakers. But the notion of stimulus meaning is that 
on which, on empiricist grounds, a theory of language must be based. 
Since the notion of stimulus meaning is not sufficient to distinguish be-
tween systematically different schemes of translation nothing empiri-
cal can distinguish between them. The famous thesis of the indetermi-
nacy of translation is nothing more than empiricism plus a recognition 
of the poverty of the stimulus.
§ 3. The drive to the outer: Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s drive to the outer is encapsulated, above all, in his no-
tion of use. According to the Blue Book, the “life of a sign”, what distin-
guishes a meaningful utterance from a mere sound, is best thought of as 
the use of a sign, and not as an occult accompaniment of it (1958: 4-5). 
The same idea is reflected in the slogan repeated throughout the Philo-
sophical Investigations, to the effect that for many expressions and in 
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many contexts, the meaning of an expression can usefully be identified 
outright with its use.
But the notion of use is itself in need of clarification. This is so not so 
much because of any ambiguity in the word “use”. Rather, it is because 
there are many ways to describe the use of a given expression. The con-
tent of the dictum that “meaning is use” will depend on what vocabu-
lary is available to describe how an expression is used.
An economic analogy may clarify matters here. Suppose I claim that 
one five pound note, on the one hand, and five one pound coins, on the 
other, are of equivalent value. Wherein does this equivalence consist? 
It does not, of course, consist in the value of the materials out of which 
the note and coins have been made. We are within reach of a better ex-
planation if we say that they are of equivalent value insofar as they can 
be used for the same purposes. 
But this will only be true if we restrict the range of uses which count as 
relevant in this context. It is relevant to point out that they can be used 
in exchange for the same goods and services. But other facts about pos-
sible uses are not relevant. The note can be used as a bookmark, for ex-
ample, whereas the coins cannot. Equally, the coins can be used to stop 
the needle of a record player from jumping, by being laid on top of it, 
whereas the note cannot. Such considerations should not lead us into 
supposing that the note and coins differ in value.
Analogously, suppose that we ask of two expressions whether they have 
the same meaning. Wittgenstein’s slogan suggests a criterion for an-
swering this question. The two expressions have the same meaning if 
and only if they have the same use. In the Philosophical Investigations, 
for example, Wittgenstein claims that the sentences “Bring me a slab” 
and its elliptical form “Slab!” have the same meaning because a build-
er can use either for the purposes of acquiring a slab from his assistant, 
and that the latter counts as elliptical merely in virtue of being shorter 
(1953: § 20).
But such a criterion will only give us a general theory of synonymy if we 
know, in general, what it is for two expression to have the same use. And 
there will be a clear answer to that question only if our notion of what 
counts as a use is narrow enough.6
6  On this point I am indebted to Goldfarb 1983.
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We could, for example, define the use of an expression as follows. The 
use of an expression is to elicit a signal of assent – a sound or bodily 
gesture – under certain environmental conditions. So two expressions 
are equivalent in meaning if they elicit assent under the same condi-
tions. On this highly specialised notion of “use”, Wittgenstein’s criteri-
on would then simply reduce to Quine’s.
Though it is highly specialised, this is a perfectly legitimate notion of 
“use”. However, it is obviously not the only one that is explicable to ex-
pressions. Wittgenstein, indeed, places great emphasis on the enor-
mous variety of uses to which expressions of a language can be put, and 
gives a long list of such possible uses in the Philosophical Investigations 
(1953: § 23). Some of the items on this list are:
Giving orders, and obeying them.
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements. ...
Reporting an event.
Speculating about an event. ...
Guessing riddles.
Making a joke; telling it. ...
Translating from one language into another.
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
Each of these activities, and many others, are called by Wittgenstein 
“language games”. It bears emphasising that these games are meant as 
the explanans and not as the explanandum of the meaningfulness of ut-
terances. When we try to understand what it is for two expressions to be 
synonymous we appeal to their use, where to use an expression is to be 
involved in activities of the sort mentioned in the list.
It is clear that, if these activities are to be understood as types of lan-
guage game, we must conceive of a language game as something more 
than a game the rules of which enjoin the production of sounds under 
defined environmental conditions, certainly if those conditions are un-
derstood in the narrowly visual way which Quine proposes.
The item which comes closest to the purely visual case is “describing 
the appearance of an object”. But even in this case, there is no indica-
tion that a description of the appearance of an object is to be construed 
as a response to a visual stimulus in Quine’s sense. To describe an ap-
pearance can be to respond to an object – a three-dimensional material 
thing – and not to respond to a chromatic irradiation, or any other sort 
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of physiological or mental event in the perceiving subject. That Witt-
genstein immediately afterwards mentions the giving of measurements 
suggests that what he has in mind is indeed a response to an object and 
not to anything like a sensory stimulation. Even in this case, then, the 
Wittgensteinian stimulus is more enriched than the Quinean.
The other examples show an even richer conception of the environ-
ment in terms of which utterances are to be understood. To understand 
an utterance as an instance of thanking, for example, one must already 
understand the speaker’s environment as one in which there are other 
agents who are candidates for gratitude.
Again, if praying is a type of language game, then to know what someone 
is doing when they utter words one must, sometimes, know what it is to 
pray, and in order to know what it is to pray one must know what God is.
The point is one which operates in two distinct directions. Wittgen-
stein’s conception of the speaker’s environment is richer than Quine’s. 
And so is his conception of what speakers are doing when they use ex-
pressions. Thus both Wittgensteinian stimuli and Wittgensteinian be-
haviour are richer – require greater resources to describe – than their 
Quinean counterparts.
It is unexceptionable to call greeting, cursing, praying and so on forms 
of behaviour. But if we include these forms of behaviour in our descrip-
tions of the uses to which speakers put expressions, we have flouted the 
empiricist restrictions observed by Quine. Wittgenstein differs from 
Quine, then, in the much richer conception of behaviour which he ap-
peals to in the evaluation of the meanings of expressions.
Similar remarks apply to the description of the environmental condi-
tions of utterances. For Wittgenstein, no restriction is placed on the 
way in which the environment is to be described. In particular, there is 
no attempt to describe the environment in exclusively visual terms, let 
alone in the rigorously perspectival terms of Quinean retinal patterns.
§ 4. Convergence
The discussion so far has emphasised a sharp divergence between 
Quine and Wittgenstein in their approaches to their common problem. 
They both advocate a drive to the outer in order to answer questions 
about meaning. But they have contrasting conceptions of what the out-
er  consists in.
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Despite this contrast, there is I believe a deeper convergence than we 
have seen so far. The convergence I have in mind manifests itself in a 
similar attitude to ontological questions. By ontological questions, 
however, I have in mind nothing abstruse. I mean, simply, questions 
about what things there are. By this criterion, if one were to ask how 
many chairs there are in the world, one would be asking an ontological 
question. With a little looseness, one could even admit into this catego-
ry questions about how many chairs there are in a given room.
In order to understand the convergence, I wish to turn first to some re-
marks Wittgenstein makes at Philosophical Investigations § 80. I will 
elaborate the scenario that is imagined in that section in a way that 
suits our purposes. Wittgenstein imagines finding himself in a room 
furnished with what is apparently a perfectly ordinary chair. It looks or-
dinary, and feels ordinary to the touch; sitting in it is like sitting in any 
other chair. 
But the chair disappears before his eyes. He pinches himself to make 
sure he is awake. Perhaps the chair has been spirited away by some 
trick, but no way in which this could have been done can be found. Per-
haps he was hallucinating the chair, but sustained, vivid multi-mod-
al hallucinations of this sort do not occur. Perhaps he is hallucinating 
its absence now, but no explanation or evidence of such can be found. 
What is more, he is assured by his friends that in this country it is the 
way of chairs to appear and disappear. 
Was there a chair in the room? It may be supposed that there was, for 
after all Wittgenstein sat in one. It may be supposed that there was not, 
for chairs are not the right sort of thing to disappear into thin air (as 
rainbows are, say) so it must not have been a chair that Wittgenstein sat 
in. It may be that there are further things we can find out about the situ-
ation which will provide an answer to the question. But this may not be 
the case: even if the situation is fully described, it may not determine 
either a “yes” or “no”.
Wittgenstein’s thought is that, in the latter circumstance, neither Eng-
lish nor German has sufficient resources to determine an answer to the 
question “was there a chair in the room?” No doubt this is because those 
languages are spoken in a world in which such things, as a matter of 
fact, do not occur. Were our world different enough, then no doubt we 
would speak a language in which we were not puzzled as to what to say, 
given the circumstances.
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Now suppose that there is such a language, L. It is enough like English 
that speakers are prepared to say the words “there is a chair in the room”, 
but also enough unlike English that they are non-plussed by the chair’s 
disappearance. It does not tempt them to withdraw their claim. 
Is what they say true? No doubt it is, provided that the description giv-
en by Wittgenstein at § 80 holds of their environment. The description, 
then, is in a sense all that need be said about chair-ontology, from the 
point of view of speakers of L. Provided that L-speakers can read Eng-
lish, they will be able to read from Wittgenstein’s description whether 
or not they would be prepared to assent to the sentence of L.
But, someone might insist, an ontological question still remains. Is 
there a chair there? As English-speakers, confronted with this question, 
how are we to proceed? It seems that are two courses of action which 
are open to us. We can recount the story of § 80, and allow ourselves to 
be satisfied with it. We could, alternatively, investigate the conditions 
under which chairs appear and disappear, as we never previously knew 
they could, thus learning something new about the world. But neither 
course of action, in itself, determines a “yes” or a “no” answer to the 
question whether there is a chair in the room. 
The difficulty is that (i) our English sentence ‘there is a chair’ is not 
translatable into any sentence of L; and (ii) is not translatable into any 
sentence of the theory we develop to explain the appearance and disap-
pearance of the chair. No doubt, were the scenario envisaged in § 80 to 
become common, we would begin talking in ways that accommodated 
the facts. The language we speak would change so that our question did 
after all admit of a definitive answer. 
But Wittgenstein’s point is that even in such a reformed language, “the 
application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules” (1953: § 84). 
The reform would handle the situation we are discussing, but not every 
possible situation.
Wittgenstein’s thought is this: we have not uncovered a flaw in  English 
when we discover that our knowledge of the language determines no 
answer to ontological questions under the conditions described in § 80. 
In this sense, ontology is language-relative. A determinate answer is 
available to the question how many chairs are there in this room, but it 
need not be. If there were not, there would be no ontological task left to 
us except to understand why there were not.
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My contention is that Quine’s attitude to ontological questions mirrors 
Wittgenstein’s. Quine advocates approaching ontological questions 
through a notion of ontological commitment.7 What is in question is 
the commitments of a particular discourse: what a given system of sen-
tences held true says there is in the world. 
According to Quine, we can deduce the ontological commitments of 
a discourse or theory by expressing it in a way that conforms to the re-
quirements of first order quantificational logic. The discourse is com-
mited to the existence of those things that the variables range over. The 
appeal to the logic of quantifiers is thus meant as a criterion for onto-
logical commitment, to be applied to the utterances of speakers.
Ontological commitment is, on this understanding, language-relative. 
What a speaker is commited to will depend on what language is being 
spoken. Quine has not shown us how to go about the business of arriv-
ing at an ontology – an account of what there is in the world – until he 
has told us what language we ought to carry out such an investigation 
in. Is there, for Quine, such a privileged language?
It may seem that Quine believes there is, so that he is unable to fol-
low Wittgenstein into a deflation of ontological questions. What de-
bars him from doing so, according to the objection I have in mind, is his 
physicalism. According to this doctrine, what exists is given by a physi-
cal description of the world, or at least will be given by a description of 
the world in the terms of a completed physics.
If this were so, then for any ontological claim, in any language, we could 
say that the claim is true if and only if it corresponds, when translated 
into a purely physical language, into part of a purely physical descrip-
tion of the world. 
The essential appeal this doctine makes to the notion of translation 
should be enough to alert us to the fact that this cannot be Quine’s 
view. According to Quine, any translation of a sentence of one language 
into a sentence of another is at best correct relative to some translation 
manual. Thus physicalism could only provide a criterion for settling on-
tological questions if it determined a translation manual: the mere pro-
vision of a physical description of the world would not be sufficient. 
But Quine’s verificationism precisely rules out the possibility of a single 
translation manual.
7  See Quine 1953a; Quine 1960: 238ff and – especially – 243n.
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Indeed, Quine’s reasons for accepting physicalism are pragmatic in na-
ture, in the sense that he does not recommend physical descriptions of 
the world on the grounds that they are more correct than other sorts of 
description. Physics is preferred, among the other ways of talking about 
the world, for its high degree of predictive power and sensitivity to sub-
tle changes in the way the world is (see Quine 1978). The reason for 
these advantages is, ultimately, that sentences about physical objects are 
“fairly directly associated with sensory stimulation” (Quine 1960: 237).
Quine’s contention then, is that physics is the best means available to us 
of describing the world. For the sake of argument, let us accept Quine’s 
contention. It does not follow that claims made within other discours-
es should only be accepted insofar as they are translatable into a true 
claim of physical discourse. The indeterminacy of translation rules out 
this move. In particular, then, it is not the case that the question “is 
there a chair in the room?” can be settled by translation into the terms 
of physics.
There is however a tension in Quine’s thought. Certain aspects of his 
approach militate against ontological deflation. As we have seen, Quin-
ean linguistics is committed to a privileged vocabulary in which to de-
scribe environmental stimuli. Such stimuli are to be described in physi-
cal terms: in the visual case, in terms of the “chromatic irradiation” of 
the speaker’s eyes. Similarly, the speakers’ responses to that environ-
ment, whether spoken or gestured, are to be described in physiological 
terms, as bodily movement and produced sound.
A form of physicalism is thus presupposed by Quine’s way of conceiving 
the empirical constraints on our understanding of language. Since no 
such constraint is presupposed by Wittgenstein’s drive to the outer, his 
deflation of ontology is more thoroughgoing than Quine’s.
Primljeno: 15. februar 2014.
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Majkl O’Saliven
Slabost stimulusa: Kvajn i vitgenštajn
Apstrakt
Kvajn i Vitgenštajn su bile dominantne ličnosti u filozofiji sredinom dvade-
setog veka. Brojni tumači, kao i sam Kvajn, smatrali su da postoje duboke 
sličnosti između ova dva mislioca, iako ih je teško artikulisati. Smatram da 
je ovim autorima zajednički projekat razumevanja značenja iskaza pomoću 
referencije na govornikovo okruženje, iako oni ovo okruženje razumevaju 
na radikalno različit način. Tako Kvajn ima znatno tanju koncepciju okru-
ženja od Vitgenštajna. Kod Kvajna stimulus je oslabljen na način na koji to 
nije kod Vitgenštajna. Takođe, u ovom radu branim tezu da obojica autora 
zastupaju određeni deflacionistički pristup ontologiji.
Ključne reči: Vitgenštajn, značenje, empirizam, jezičke igre, ontologija.

